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Abstract. Increasing adoption of Open Source Software (OSS) requires a 
change in the organizational culture and reshaping IT decision-makers mindset. 
Adopting OSS software components introduces some risks that can affect the 
adopter organization’s business goals, therefore they need to be considered. To 
assess these risks, it is required to understand the socio-technical structures that 
interrelate the stakeholders in the OSS ecosystem, and how these structures may 
propagate the potential risks to them. In this paper, we study the connection be-
tween OSS adoption risks and OSS adopter organizations’ business goals. We 
propose a model-based approach and analysis framework that combines two ex-
isting frameworks: the i* framework to model and reason about business goals, 
and the RiskML notation to represent and analyse OSS adoption risks. We illus-
trate our approach with data drawn from an industrial partner organization in a 
joint EU project.  
Keywords: risk analysis, open source software, i* framework, i-star 
1 Introduction 
Open Source Software (OSS) has become a driver for business in various sectors, 
namely the primary and secondary IT sector. Estimates exist that in 2016, a 95% of all 
commercial software packages will include OSS components [1].  
OSS adoption impacts in fact far beyond technology, because it requires a change 
in the organizational culture and reshaping IT decision-makers mindset. Hence, the 
way in which organizations adopt OSS affects and shapes their businesses. At the 
same time, OSS software components introduce various risks that may not be visible 
at the time of the adoption, but can manifest in later development and maintenance 
1 This work is a result of the RISCOSS project, funded by the EC 7th Framework Programme 
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phases, causing unexpected failures. These risks may have an impact on the business 
goals of the adopter organization.  
In this paper, we study the connection between risks and the business goals of the 
OSS adopter organizations, and how risks propagating through OSS ecosystem struc-
tures may compromise stakeholders’ strategic goals. The present work builds upon 
the results of two previous papers: 
(1) In [2] we proposed goal-oriented models using the i* approach [3] to model the 
different existing OSS adoption strategies. The models describe the consequenc-
es of adopting one such strategy or another: which are the business goals that are 
supported, which are the resources that emerge, which are the dependencies that 
exist between the different actors of the OSS ecosystem, etc.  
(2) In [4] we presented a framework for risk modelling and risk evaluation, which is 
tailored to assess OSS adoption risks. The framework is comprised by a risk 
modelling language (RiskML) and a quantitative reasoning algorithm that anal-
yses risk models.  
The present work proposes to align RiskML models and i* models to analyse the 
propagation of the risk impact towards the business goals of the OSS adopter and the 
rest of actors of an OSS ecosystem. It is guided by two main research questions: 
• RQ1: What is the conceptual relationship between OSS adoption risks and 
the adopter organization business goals?  
• RQ2: How do OSS adoption risks affect the adopter organization business 
goals?  
RQ1 explores how the risk and business goal-oriented modelling approaches can be 
integrated into a single modelling framework. This will be done by formulating an 
integrated metamodel that will serve as a basis for the design of risk-aware OSS eco-
systems (RQ1.1), and then by offering means to examine the relationship between 
risks and business goals at the instance level (RQ1.2). RQ2 explores how existing risk 
and business model analysis techniques can be combined to propagate the results of 
risk analysis to business goals, considering the relationships that may exist among 
actors which collaborate in OSS ecosystems.  
This research is part of an ongoing European FP7 project (RISCOSS, 
www.riscoss.eu), which aims to support organizations in understanding, managing 
and mitigating risks during OSS adoption [5]. The preliminary validation of our re-
search results was performed at one of the industrial partners (Ericsson Italy at Paga-
ni, TEI), where the approach helped illustrating how risks during the adoption and 
maintenance of OSS components may impact on its business goals. 
As research method we adopted a design science approach following the engineer-
ing cycle described in [6]. This fits well with the research aim to create new meta-
model artefacts, while also acquiring new knowledge. Fig. 1 illustrates the cycle, 
which includes problem investigation, solution design and solution validation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly provides additional 
background which is illustrated through a running example drawn from Ericsson’s 
business and development environment. Sections 3 to 5 present the integrated risk and 
business modelling framework, the steps taken to align both risk and business models 
and illustrates the proposed analysis engine. Section 6 presents related work, while 
Section 7 concludes and points to future work. 
 
Fig. 1 Steps of the engineering cycle following [6]. 
2 Background 
In this section we present the two modelling frameworks upon which we build our 
proposal, namely the i* framework and the RiskML modelling language. In order to 
illustrate their concepts, we will use a running example from the RISCOSS project. 
Running example. TEI is part of Ericsson, one of the world’s leading telecommu-
nication corporations. Ericsson produces hardware (telecommunications infrastructure 
and devices) as well as the software to run it. The company’s mission is to empower 
people, business and society at large, guided by a vision of a sustainable networked 
society. One of TEI’s roles within the Ericsson ecosystem is to provide OSS alterna-
tives to support efficient third party products handling. However, adopting OSS com-
ponents also exposes TEI to risk, because OSS comes typically without legal con-
tracts that guarantee the adopter over time about software functionalities and qualities, 
so the company may suffer towards its partners and customer for lacks in the adopted 
software. It must therefore undertake adequate actions to analyse, assess and possibly 
mitigate potential risks.  
2.1 Business Goal Models: i* 
In OSS ecosystems, actors pursue their goals while interacting with other actors. The 
i* framework [3] was formulated for representing, modelling and reasoning about 
socio-technical systems. Its modelling language (the i* language) is composed by a 
set of graphic constructs which can be used in two diagrams. Firstly, the Strategic 
Dependency (SD) diagram, including the organizational Actors. Actors have Depend-
encies, one actor (Depender) depends on other (Dependee) for the achievement of 
some intention (Dependum). The main intentional elements are: Resource, Task, Goal 
and Softgoal. Softgoals represent goals with no clear criteria for their satisfaction. 
Secondly, the Strategic Rationale (SR) diagram represents the internal actors’ ra-
tionale. The rationality of each actor is represented using the same types of intentional 
elements described above. Additionally these intentional elements can be interrelated 
by using relationships such as Means-end (e.g., a task can be a mean to achieve a 
goal), Contributions (e.g., some resource could contribute to reach a quality concern 
or softgoal) and Decompositions (e.g., a task can be divided into subtasks). 
Fig. 2 shows an excerpt of the TEI business model related to the maintenance of 
products including some OSS component, and how its business goals impact on Er-
icsson’s goals. Besides the typical business goal of any organization for reducing 
costs (goal Cost reduced), the main objectives for TEI are fulfilling the Ericsson’s 
customers’ requirements (softgoal Product requirements achieved) using a Maintain-
able code in order to secure the quality (Quality of code). For TEI it is crucial to use 
Mature technology and Secure code. When TEI decides to use an OSS component, 
there are three possibilities for maintaining this code: they can assume the activity 
(Provide in-house maintenance), rely to the community behind the OSS component 
(Rely on the OSS community for maintenance) or rely to a third party organization 
(Contract 3PP organization for maintenance). For this portion of the TEI’s business 
model, the impacted Ericsson business goals are Time-to-market reduced and Reputa-
tion kept. Ericsson expects from TEI that the Development time is reduced, Respon-
siveness and Reliable products for achieving its business goals. Notice that the model 
only includes the third party organization (3PP OSS Provider) in order to illustrate 
that the maintenance is outsourced; for the sake of brevity, the description of this 
relation is not exhaustive and not all dependencies between both organizations are 
included in this model. 
 
Fig. 2 TEI business goal model 
2.2 Risk Models: RiskML 
OSS ecosystems rotate around the production and use of OSS software components. 
RiskML is a modelling language introduced in [4] to capture knowledge related to 
risks of software components and to support automated analysis. RiskML uses the 
concepts of Event - a change in states of affairs, which may harm goals [7], with a 
certain likelihood, and significance; Goal - anything, which is of interest for a stake-
holder to obtain or to maintain; and Situation - states of affairs, under which risks are 
possible [8][9]. Additionally, Indicators represent one (simple indicator) or more 
(composite indicator) gathered measures about a certain property of a software com-
ponent [8]. By means of transformation functions, indicators inform about the evi-
dence of being in certain situations. The Indicate relation represents such transfor-
mation, propagating the value of an indicator to the evidence that a situation is satis-
fied. Expose, Protect, Increase and Reduce relations raise a target event’s likelihood, 
lower it, raise an event’s significance or lower it, respectively. The Impact relation 
represents the negative effect of a certain event on the satisfaction of a given goal. 
The higher the impact, the higher is the severity of the negative impact. The exposure 
to a certain risk is defined as a combination of the risky event’s likelihood, its signifi-
cance, and the severity of its impact to goals. For details on RiskML see [4].  
Fig. 3 shows an excerpt of a risk model related to OSS code maintainability (indi-
cators in relationship to situations are not displayed for space reasons, as well as in-
formation like likelihood and significance). The model is based on (1) interviews with 
managers, (2) a literature study on OSS risks [10] and (3) various metrics for code 
quality, such as complexity metrics, lines of code, and test coverage; such metrics 
have been shown in [11] to serve as measures of the maintainability of the source 
code. These measures do not offer absolute measures of maintainability, but assist in 
identifying where code exhibits properties that are known to decrease (or increase) 
maintainability, showing correlation e.g. with the time and skills needed to maintain 
the code. For example, code that is more complex takes more time to be understood 
by the analysts; this can lead to delays in bug fixing and code maintenance and evolu-
tion activities. 
 
Fig. 3 RiskML risk model for OSS code maintainability 
Following the definition of risk as a combination of event likelihood and the severity 
of its impact, the risk model comprises risk events, situations as a means to capture 
risk indicators, and the goals that are directly impacted by the risk events. For exam-
ple, the central goal of this risk model is Use maintainable component (regarding the 
quality and modifiability of the code and the availability of documentation), there are 
high level goals like Satisfying own quality and functional requirements throughout 
the time of maintenance, and lower level goals such as to continuously Obtain inno-
vation from the OSS community, to have access to a proper documentation, or to rely 
on a proficient 3rd party for maintenance.  
3 An Integrated Model for Risks and Goals 
3.1 Analysis of Overlapping Concepts 
Integrating the product models of two methods requires identifying concepts that have 
the same semantics, and to merge them afterwards. Following the approach proposed 
in [12], we have opted for using ontological analysis to identify these concepts, map-
ping the concepts of the two methods to the concepts of a reference ontology. Among 
possible options (e.g., BWW, Chisholm’s, DOLCE, etc.), we have chosen the UFO 
ontology [13][14]. UFO is a foundational ontology that has been used to analyse, 
redesign and integrate language models in a large number of domains. 
The starting points are the mappings between both modelling languages concepts 
(i* and RiskML) and those of UFO. The concepts which are mapped onto the same or 
related UFO concepts are considered candidate overlapping concepts for an integrated 
i*-RiskML model. Finally, we analyse the overlap and decide whether to map the 
concepts unconditionally (i.e. in all cases) or under certain conditions. Fig. 4 presents 
our initial mappings and the candidate overlapping concepts obtained from them. 
Only the mappings involved in our analysis are included.  
Regarding the i* and UFO mapping, we adopt the interpretations presented in [15] 
(see Fig. 4). We use the same notion for softgoal as [15] since it does not have a uni-
form treatment, as the paper points out. We consider that an i* Softgoal is a goal for 
which it is possible that two rational agents differ in their beliefs to which situations 
satisfy it. Conversely, for an i* Goal (or hardgoal), the set of situations that satisfy it 
is necessarily shared by all agents.  
 
Fig. 4 i* and RiskML overlapping concepts according to UFO mappings 
Next, we provide the mapping between RiskML and UFO2. A Goal in RiskML is 
defined as anything which is of interest for a stakeholder to obtain or maintain. As 
such, it is satisfied if the corresponding state of affairs is achieved. Goals in UFO are 
related to sets of intended states of affairs of an agent. UFO contemplates a relation 
2 UFO concepts appear underlined in the text whereas RiskML and i* ones appear in italics. 
                                                          
between Situations and Goals such that one or more Situations may satisfy a Goal. In 
other words, a Goal is a proposition and a particular state of affairs can be the truth-
maker of that proposition. Consequently, the RiskML Goal concept can be interpreted 
as a Goal in UFO. Events in RiskML model changes in states of affairs. From the 
UFO ontology, we have that an Event (instance of Event Universal) is a perduring 
entity, i.e., entities that occur in time, accumulating their temporal parts. Events are 
triggered by certain Situations in reality (termed their pre-situations) and they change 
the world by producing a different post-situation. Consequently, the RiskML Event 
can be interpreted as an UFO Event Universal.  
Next we describe the i*-RiskML candidate overlapping concepts identified after 
analysing the mappings (see Fig. 4). The RiskML Goal overlaps both the i* Goal 
(also called hardgoal) and the i* Softgoal. These concepts map unconditionally, mean-
ing that any i* Goal and any i* Softgoal maps into a RiskML Goal and also any 
RiskML Goal maps into either a i* Goal or a i* Softgoal, since they all map into the 
same UFO concept. The RiskML Event overlaps the i* Task. These two concepts map 
only under certain conditions because: (1) they map into UFO Event Universal and 
UFO Action Universal, respectively and, (2) according to UFO, only Events deliber-
ately performed by Agents in order to fulfil their Intentions are Actions. Therefore, all 
i* Tasks map into RiskML Events but not all RiskML Events map into i* Tasks.  
3.2 Analysis of the Impact Relation 
The Impact relation in RiskML relates an Event E and a Goal G such that the occur-
rence of E has an effect on the satisfaction of G (e.g. the event post-situation does not 
satisfy the goal). Since RiskML Goals map into i* Goals and i* Softgoals, it follows 
that goals and softgoals are the only i* elements that can be the target of an Impact 
relation. However, we argue that i* Tasks and i* Resources could also be involved in 
impact relations for shortcutting purposes. 
As mentioned above, i* Tasks are interpreted as UFO Action Universals. Accord-
ing to UFO, Actions are intentional Events, i.e., events with the specific purpose of 
satisfying some goals. Therefore, any Action Universal (Task) implies the existence 
of an underlying Goal, explicit or not (i.e., it is a hidden goal). If the hidden Goal of a 
Task is impacted by an Event, as a shortcut, we allow to use Task as target of the Im-
pact relation to avoid making the goal explicit and thus to cause excessive model 
growth).  
The case of i* Resources is quite similar. Intuitively, for any i* Resource we may 
assume the existence of the underlying Goal on getting the resource available to an 
agent, explicit or not in the i* model. Again, for shortcutting purposes, we propose to 
specify Resource as the target of the Impact relation. 
3.3 Metamodel Integration: the i*-RiskML Metamodel 
We start from the i* metamodel presented in [16] and the RiskML metamodel in [4]. 
To integrate them, we take into account the overlapping concepts (Section 3.1) and 
the shortcuts for the Impact relation (Section 3.2). For each set of overlapping con-
cepts and assuming that each one has a corresponding metaclass in the initial meta-
models, we need to decide whether to keep all the corresponding metaclasses of both 
metamodels, or just the metaclasses from one metamodel. To make such decisions, 
we slightly adapt the heuristics proposed in [12]. In cases where the concepts are to-
tally equivalent, the simplest solution is to keep only the metaclasses from one meta-
model (it must be decided which one); the others are removed. Clearly, the associa-
tions in which the removed metaclasses participated need to be reconnected accord-
ingly. In the cases where the mapping of concepts is qualified with a condition speci-
fying under which circumstances they can be mapped, all metaclasses should be kept 
and relations should be defined between them. Table 1 summarises the application of 
these heuristics to our case and Fig. 5 shows the resulting metamodel. 
Table 1. i* and RiskML metamodel integration 
RiskML i* i*- RiskML 
Concept Concept Metaclasses kept Rationale 
Event Task Both (Task subclass  of Event) Task  Event, not (Event  Task) 
Goal Goal, 
Softgoal 
Goal, Softgoal (from i*) Equivalent (i* more fine-grained 
representation for goals) 
Assoc.  Metaassociations reconnected Rationale 
Impact   relates Event to Intention-
alElement (superclass Goal, 
Softgoal, Task, Resource) 
Goal and Softgoal are equivalent to 
Goal, Task and Resource for 
shortcutting 
 
Fig. 5 i* - RiskML integrated metamodel 
4 Aligning Models for an Organization  
In this section, we consider the alignment of a business model and a risk model in a 
concrete organization. We use the TEI case presented in Section 2. 
It is worth to mention that the concrete form of the alignment may depend on the 
business case in which it is done. In this section, we assume that: the risk model is 
part of a catalogue of reusable models and as such, it cannot be modified. The busi-
ness model is produced independently of the risk model (either because it already 
existed, or the business modeller was not aware of the risk model, or even it could 
have been a conscious decision to avoid bias in the business model). We think that 
this scenario can be quite usual when analysing the impact of risks in business goals. 
4.1 Alignment Method for the Impact Relation 
According to the results of Section 3, we analyse the possible mapping of every im-
pacted goal in the risk model with some intentional element in the business model. In 
other words, the alignment problem may be stated as: 
Given a business model B which contains a set I of intentional elements, and given 
a risk model R which contains a set G of goals, we want to combine them to pro-
duce a new model M in which the goals in G are semantically connected to the in-
tentional elements in I according to the ontological framework defined in 3. 
We define M as initially including B’s actors with their corresponding SR diagram 
as in B. We analyse next the effect of each goal g in the risk model on the initial mod-
el M. Let’s call M’ the model resulting of this step. 
Alignment case 1. There is an intentional element x in B such that g can be consid-
ered semantically equivalent to x. In this case, the model M’ will keep x and will 
include the impacts from events in R to g but changing x by g. 
Alignment case 2. There is an intentional element x in B which subsumes g. In this 
case, the model M’ includes both related through the appropriate model construct 
(e.g., means-end if x is a goal, or contribution link if it is a softgoal). The impacts 
from events in R to g are also included in M’. 
Alignment case 3. There is no x in B satisfying cases 1 or 2. This means that there is 
no obvious impact from the risk to any business goal. In this case, it is necessary 
to further interact with the business analyst with two possible outcomes: 
a. g is in fact pointing out a business goal which has been neglected in the initial 
version of the business model B. The business model needs to be updated and 
g finally falls into the cases 1 or 2.  
b. g is indicating a risk that is not important for the company. In this case, g is not 
added in M’, as well as any other element in R (e.g situation) related only to g.  
4.2 Alignment Application and Results 
The alignment between a general risk model (Fig. 3) and an organization business 
goal model (Fig. 2), follows the iterative process previously defined. The risk model 
gives awareness on specific issues, which need to be analysed to decide if they may or 
may not be needed to be addressed in a specific organization, e.g. because a goal is 
not important in the particular context. The addressed goals are then put in relation to 
the organization’s goals, also joining semantically similar goals from both models. 
Table 2 Alignment of Business and Risk models 
 g in R x in B New link 
Alignment case 1 (equivalent) 
g1 Obtain maintenance from the 
community 
Rely on the OSS community 
for maintenance 
 
g2 Rely on 3rd party maintenance Contract 3PP organization for 
maintenance 
 
g3 Use known and mature software Mature technology used  
g4 Use maintainable components Maintainable code  
Alignment case 2 (subsumes) 
g5 Satisfy (own) changing functional 
requirements 
Product requirements achieved contribution link 
g6 Satisfy own quality requirements Product requirements achieved contribution link 
Alignment case 3.a (new business goals) 




task-decomposition (Adopt OSS component) 
contribution link (Maintainable code) 
Alignment rule 3.b (discarded) 
g8 Obtain innovation from OSS   
 
Applying the guidelines presented above, Table 2 includes the alignment between 
the models presented in Section 2, a business model B (Fig. 2) and a risk model R 
(Fig. 3). In this concrete example, goals from g1 to g4 are equivalent (Alignment case 
1). In this case, the elements from B are kept. For g1 and g2, the intentional elements 
in B are tasks, so the underlying goals to these tasks in B are equivalent to the goals in 
R. Goals g5 and g6 are subsumed by one element of B (Alignment case 2), therefore 
the elements from R are included in B as goals. Finally, for missing goals (Alignment 
case 3), g7 is included in the TEI business model (as a softgoal) and g8 is discarded. 
 
Fig. 6 TEI SR diagram connected to RiskML risk events 
Fig. 6 shows the part of M in the TEI running example which includes the align-
ments above. Concretely, it includes the SR diagram for the actor TEI, including the 
new elements and the impacts from the Risk Events included in R. 
5 Risk Analysis 
The alignments described in the previous sections allow us to perform a model-based 
analysis of OSS ecosystems, linking the metrics of OSS projects to their impact on 
business goals. Risk analysis in RiskML is a reasoning technique, described in [4], 
which uses forward quantitative inference algorithms to evaluate risk exposure. The 
algorithm starts from the gathered indicators about OSS projects, and applies infer-
ence rules to derive exposure to risky events: firstly, indicator values are mapped onto 
the satisfaction evidence of situations; afterwards, situation satisfaction raises or low-
ers the occurrence likelihood of events (expose and protect relations) or their signifi-
cance (increase and reduce relations). The impact of risk events on the software eco-
systems is captured by goal analysis, which is a technique for reasoning on i* models, 
described in [17]. In a nutshell, it relies on the idea that actors want their goals to be 
achieved, so well-engineered goal models should ensure goal satisfiability. In goal 
analysis, intentional elements hold a satisfiability evidence and a deniability evidence, 
representing the evidence that the intentional element can be achieved or not 
achieved. Satisfiability and deniability evidence can hold at the same time for the 
same intentional element, thus representing the existence of contradictory infor-
mation. Both value types are propagated across an i* goal model: and-or decomposi-
tions propagate satisfiability evidence from operational goals to tactical and strategic 
goals, while contribution link represent partial or total, positive or negative effect of a 
source goal to a different one. 
Risks affect negatively goals, because they can reduce their chance to be achieved. 
The impact relation represents this negative effect: the more the source event is likely 
and significant, the more there is evidence that the impacted goal is not achievable. 
This is depicted in the integrated model in Fig. 7, where the RiskML model concern-
ing maintenance quality risks is plugged into the goal model of an adopter. E.g., the 
Reduced component quality risk event impacts on the Quality of code softgoal. If the 
event is exposed (likely and significant), there is evidence that the softgoal is denied. 
Once a goal has been impacted, this impact can be propagated across the goal model. 
The denial evidence of the Quality of code softgoal propagates through the model to 
other goals, having a negative effect on the Maintainable code softgoal and on the 
Product requirements achieved softgoal. When an actor is part of an OSS ecosystem, 
it depends on other actors for having goals fulfilled, and itself fulfils goals for them. 
When an actor (dependee) fails in fulfilling a goal for another one (depender), the 
depender suffers consequences. The Ericsson actor is at risk of losing reputation if 
TEI fails in satisfying the product requirements. Thus the value of the indicators, cap-
tured through the situations, raises risks that span through the whole model. 
 
Fig. 7 Example flow of risk propagation in a OSS ecosystem 
6 Related Work  
Several works dealt with the modelling of risks in the context of organizations 
through goal-oriented languages. The Goal-Risk framework by Asnar et al. [7] uses i* 
to capture, analyse and assess risk at an early stage of the requirements engineering 
process. They distinguish an asset layer to model business goals, an event layer to 
model risk events, and a treatment layer to model mitigation actions. We build on top 
of their approach and extend it in two directions: first, we support complex indicators, 
connecting risk models to data sources; and, second, we extend the goal analysis sup-
port, adding the capability to analyse how risks are propagated across a set of actors. 
Additionally, the choice of using two different languages - risk and goal modelling - 
instead of an integrated one, is of help in models reuse, allowing us to study how the 
same risks may impact on different strategies or different ecosystems. 
The KAOS methodology [18] deals with risk management by complementing goal 
modelling with obstacle analysis that consists in identifying the adverse conditions 
that may prevent a goal to be achieved [19]. KAOS has a formal representation for 
goal models, and takes into account partial or probabilistic values for goal satisfac-
tion, allowing quantitative reasoning on the models but does not integrate concrete 
measures and indicators. Sabetzadeh et al. [20] presents an approach, based on KAOS, 
which uses statistical reasoning to analyse the problem of introducing a new technol-
ogy in an organization. Assessing the risk related to the possible non-compliance of 
the new technology to the fixed standards or internal regulations. CORAS [21] is a 
model-based approach for security risk analysis and assessment, comprised by a risk 
modelling language, a process for security analysis, and a tool for reporting risk anal-
ysis results. It limits to a defensive risk analysis to protect company assets, and does 
not rely on a particular reasoning technique. Finally, Grandry et al. [22] integrates an 
enterprise architecture model and an information system security risk management 
model by mapping concepts of two metamodels from both domains. A main differ-
ence to ours proposal is that it focuses on the management of an enterprise more than 
on the analysis of a larger organization where the presence of multiple interacting 
actors and the strategic dependencies among them is of crucial importance. Moreover, 
our approach also proposes a set of guidelines to align the different models at the 
level of the model instances. 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper we have presented an ongoing work to analyse OSS adoption from a risk 
management perspective. The work is motivated by the need of industry actors, repre-
sented here by Ericsson, to understand the impact of OSS adoption risks on their 
business goals, and how that impact can spread over a whole ecosystem. The ap-
proach is quite general, though, and could be applied to other kinds of risks, providing 
the adequate business and risks models. We have chosen two modelling languages 
that are able to represent the business environment and the underlying risks, and sup-
port goal and risk analysis, respectively. To explore the interaction of risks and goals 
in the OSS ecosystem, we have developed a formal alignment of concepts, and shown 
how this reflects on the analysis, applying it to the case of OSS adoption. 
The main contributions of this work are: (1) the integrated metamodel including 
goals and risks related concepts (RQ1.1), using the foundational ontology UFO in 
order to provide an ontological matching between the concepts Goal and Event from 
RiskML and Goal, Softgoal and Task of i*, concluding that a Risk can Impact on any 
type of i* Intentional Elements (Goal, Softgoal, Task and Resource); (2) a methodol-
ogy to plug a risk model to a goal model. (RQ1.2); (3) the propagation techniques in 
order to show how risk exposure can reflect in an evidence of goal denial, which intu-
itively means that higher risk causes higher possibility that the goal will not be 
achieved (RQ2). The Ericsson case has been used as preliminary validation. Besides 
the validation of the formal framework, this case has shown the adequacy of the pro-
posal in an industrial setting. Although we may expect that models may grow in more 
complete cases, the business and risk models themselves are not expected to grow 
proportionally, supporting then scalability of the approach. Of course, further valida-
tion of this statement is required. 
The conceptual alignment described in this paper allowed us to map a formalism 
for reasoning on risk exposure onto another well-suited to reason on goal satisfaction. 
While this is good for integration purposes, having a finer-grained analysis technique 
would help in providing more specific results. Future work goes along several direc-
tions. First, we are interested in assigning importance degree to goals, in order to clas-
sify the risks impact on the basis of their severity. Also, this will allow us to develop 
reasoning techniques to select mitigation strategies to reduce risk exposure. Second, it 
will be important to explore the risk–goal relation in the other way, understanding 
how OSS adoption can impact the measures and modify the risk exposure. Third, we 
also need to work further in the alignment between risk and goal models, so that the 
process that has been depicted in Section 4 becomes more prescriptive (e.g. risks im-
pacting on dependums). Lastly, further validation of the approach is needed in order 
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